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banned psychoanalysis as a Jewish science
and there was no organized psychotherapy
in a situation dominated by racial biology.
In Psychotherapy in the Third Reich, Cocks
recovered the history of the German
institute for psychological research and
psychotherapy, generally known as the
Goering Institute after its chief, the
psychotherapist Mathias Goering, a cousin
of the infamous Hermann Goering. He
dismantled these legends, and indicated how
they arose in a postwar era of institutional
reconstruction for psychotherapy and
psychoanalysis, when practitioners were
keen to claim a moral high ground and
portray themselves as intrinsically allied to
liberal and democratic tendencies and deny
any evidence to the contrary. At the same
time, he presented what remains the best
documented and mostjudicious account of
C G Jung's relations with German
psychotherapy at this time. What Cocks
accomplished was the relocation of the
history ofpsychoanalysis within the
institutional development of psychotherapy
as a whole, and of the latter in its
connections with medicine and psychology
and within the wider social and political
context ofmid-twentieth-century Germany.
Thus the history ofpsychotherapy and
psychoanalysis become critical sites for
addressing wider questions concerning how
professions develop in relation to varying
social and political conditions-critical, in
Cocks' view, as by the nature of its subject
matter, the psychological enterprise is the
most permeable of all disciplines to social
and political factors. Thus the cultural and
historical study of psychology,
psychoanalysis and psychotherapy may
ultimately have more generality than the
disciplines themselves.
Finally, in a study of the emigre
psychoanalyst Heinz Kohut, Cocks
demonstrates that in the essay 'Two
analyses of Mr. Z.' that launched Kohut's
popular brand of self psychology, Mr. Z.
was a fiction, and the analyses in question
were Kohut's of Ruth Eissler, and his own
subsequent self-analysis. In the foreword to
this volume Peter Loewenberg argues that
this revelation of the subjective source of
Kohut's discoveries gives them a "greater
validity and conviction" (p. xii). For this
reviewer, it indicates rather that
dissimulation and invented narratives are no
less present in contemporary psychoanalysis
than at its inception.
Sonu Shamdasani,
Wellcome Institute for the History
of Medicine
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John Forrester, Truth games: lies, money,
andpsychoanalysis, Cambridge, MA, and
London, Harvard University Press, 1997,
pp. xiii, 210, £15.50 (0-674-53962-1).
These two books present a series ofeight
wide-ranging but interconnected essays.
Taken as an ensemble, they deal with the
history ofpsychoanalysis, redefinitions of
psychoanalysis and what it means to be a
Freudian, psychoanalytic readings of
contemporary cultural issues, discussions of
the scientific status of psychoanalysis and
an impassioned defence ofpsychoanalysis.
They frequently shift between these various
registers, and psychoanalysis appears
interchangeably as a historical and a
contemporary discourse. The essays are
elegantly written, and open up a number of
new perspectives on these issues, as well as
putting forward new formulations of more
familiar ones. If there is one central issue
that stands out, it is that of reading. How is
one to read Freud? How was Freud read,
and misread? What effects did the reading
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of Freud have on the constitution of the
psychoanalytic movement?
Dispatchesfrom the Freud wars
commences with an essay on 'Justice, envy
and psychoanalysis'. This takes up issues
concerning the transformation wrought in
conventional understandings of the relation
between politics, the individual, morality
and the emotions by psychoanalysis. It
focuses on the role of envy in politics, and
articulates the effect that psychoanalysis
may have on political theory. 'Casualties of
truth' takes up a reading of Freud's most
extensive and significant correspondence,
with Sandor Ferenczi. It focuses on
Ferenczi's intertwined incestuous analyses
and affairs with Gizella Palos and her
daughter, Elma Palos. Forrester traces
Freud's intimate involvement with this
scenario, through his analysis of Elma Palos
and discussions with Ferenczi. This leads
him to characterize Freud and Ferenczi's
respective valuations of love and truth.
Forrester concludes that the distinctiveness
of psychoanalysis lies in its unconcern for
ethical principles.
'Collector, naturalist, surrealist' takes up
the significance of Freud's activity as a
collector not only of antiquities, but of
objects in the wider sense of the word, such
as dreams, slips and other so-called
products of the unconscious, and the
manner in which this was constitutive of
psychoanalysis. It is in Freud's activity as a
collector that Forrester locates Freud's
connections to the tradition ofVlctorian
scientific naturalism.
'Dream readers' takes up the question of
how Freud created a science out of a self-
analysis, and traces the effects of the
autobiographical nature of The
interpretation ofdreams on its readers.
Forrester argues that the significance of its
autobiographical content was that it
cultivated an identification with Freud and
served the pedagogical and analytic purpose
ofmaking readers into Freudians. In
Forrester's reading, The interpretation of
dreams is a "transferential machine" that
helped constitute the psychoanalytic
movement. Whilst there have been many
studies of Freud as a writer, this is the first
which links an analysis of Freud's writings
with its micro-social context, or rather, with
the manner in which it produced the social
context of the psychoanalytic movement.
This leads Forrester to argue that what
differentiates psychoanalysis from other
comparable movements is that one becomes
a Freudian through reading. Consequently,
he claims that the presence of
psychoanalysis in humanities departments is
entirely appropriate, as it is Freud's readers,
rather than the institutions which police his
legacy, who are the true Freudians.
'A whole climate of opinion' narrates the
historiography ofpsychoanalysis, and
indicates the manner in which histories of
psychoanalysis, such as those by Ernest
Jones and Henri Ellenberger, have been
bound up with conceptions of what
psychoanalysis is and should be. Forrester
argues for the need for a history of
psychoanalytic cultures and further research
into the relation between psychoanalysis
and medical institutions and practices at the
turn of the century. These are
recommendations which can be heartily
endorsed.
'Dispatches from the Freud wars'
contends with a selection of contemporary
critiques of psychoanalysis, Stanley Fish,
Adolf Gruinbaum, Frederick Crews, and
Frank Sulloway. Forrester critiques their
outmoded conceptions of science, and the
applicability of these conceptions to
psychoanalysis. He correctly indicates the
sterility of contemporary debates concerning
the scientific status of psychoanalysis, and
appropriately suggests that a more fruitful
issue is adequately characterizing the
discipline of psychoanalysis. Forrester's
redefinition of psychoanalysis through the
course of these books is critical to the task
at hand. Robert Wallerstein recommended a
decade ago that the plethora of versions of
psychoanalysis should lead one to speak of
psychoanalyses in the plural, rather than
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psychoanalysis in the singular. The version
ofpsychoanalysis here defended is that
which is articulated in the course of these
essays. Taking up philosophical discussions
of Freud, Forrester argues that
psychoanalysis is continuous with ordinary,
everyday explanations of behaviour. A
question not raised is whether this
continuity is simply an effect of the
"transferential machine" ofpsychoanalytic
writing and the manner in which it has
inflected vernacular speech. In answer to
Freud's rhetorical question as to what else
psychoanalysis could be except science,
Forrester answers, popular culture.
However, this raises the question of
whether, through its very spread and
absorption, psychoanalysis simply loses all
determinate identity, through what Edward
Sapir would have called linguistic drift.
At the beginning of the century, Freud
and his followers claimed that critics who
had not practised psychoanalysis were
discounted from passing any comment on
it. In a new twist to this, Forrester proposes
that before one can criticize psychoanalysis,
one has to "lie down on the couch". This
recommendation is problematic in many
respects, not least because, in
psychoanalysis, the patient's testimony is
deprived of any epistemological status. If
experiencing psychoanalysis is the necessary
qualification for commenting on it, should
it not equally hold for other mind-affecting
practices, such as past-life regression
therapy, ECT or Prozac? As the history of
psychoanalysis has shown, self-experience
and testimony have simply led to a plethora
of contradictory accounts, with no criteria
to judge their relative validity. Furthermore,
if psychoanalysis wishes to transform and
colonize other disciplines, should it not also
be held accountable in terms of their own
criteria ofvalidity?
Dispatchesfrom the Freud wars ends with
a fictional interview between Forrester and
Freud, in which the latter deals with the
posthumous criticisms of his work which
have arisen after his death. Readers are
likely to find this either amusing or bizarre,
according to their tastes.
Truth games commences with an essay of
the same name which presents a history of
lying, or rather, traces discussions of lying
and its significance in philosophy, science,
medicine (under the guise of the placebo
effect) and the social sciences. The value of
this approach is that it opens the way to
situating the rise of such disciplines within
the history of ethics. This is then used to
situate the specificity ofpsychoanalysis,
which according to Forrester is "the only
science that does not find the prospect that
the 'object' of its inquiry may intentionally
deceive the scientific investigator subversive
ofits pretensions to truth" (p. 69). One
would have hoped for more comparative
discussion in support of such a statement.
This background is utilized to trace the
place of truth and lying in the creation of
psychoanalysis, and the manner in which
Freud conceived of their relation in a way
that was distinct both from traditional
morality and the epistemology of the
natural sciences. Certain questions may be
posed here. In his reading of Freud's
discussion of transference, Forrester argues
that in 1895 Freud had already in some
measure arrived at the view that there "are
no indications of reality in the
unconscious", a formulation which is
generally seen to arise in the aftermath of
the collapse of the seduction theory in 1897,
which is discussed at more length in Freud's
women (Forrester and Lisa Appignanesi,
London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1992). If
Forrester's argument holds, it raises the
question of how the seduction theory of
1896 was even possible.
Truth games closes with an essay on 'Gift,
money and debt', which discusses the
linkages between money and speech,
metaphors of circulation, exchange,
indebtedness and trust, through a reading of
Freud's case of the Rat Man and Lacan's
reading of Freud. Here, Forrester argues
that trust "organises any reading of Freud
which will do justice to his work ... One
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must give Freud the benefit of the
doubt-and extend this seemingly
temporary charitable act indefinitely"
(p. 112). One may well ask whether such
charity is to be considered the hallmark of
any good reading, or, if not, why it is only
Freud to whom it is due, as often appears
to be the case.
In conclusion, anyone interested in the
history ofpsychoanalysis and the cultural
location ofpsychoanalysis today is likely to
find these essays stimulating, engaging and
inviting of dialogue.
Sonu Shamdasani,
Weilcome Institute for the History
of Medicine
Howard I Kushner, A cursing brain? The
histories of Tourette syndrome, Cambridge,
MA, and London, Harvard University
Press, 1999, pp. xiii, 303, illus., £18.50
(0-674-180224).
To come right to the point, Howard
Kushner has written a masterful history of
the disorder known as Tourette syndrome.
It is a fine contribution to the history of
medicine, a cautionary tale for anyone
embarking on the history of a syndrome or
a disease, and a very good read. And it is a
book about far more thanjust the history
ofTourette syndrome.
At the roots ofthis studyis yet another
version ofthetime-honoured tensions and
conflicts between thosewho favour the
somatic explanatory tradition and thosewho
favour thepsychological explanatory
tradition. As has all too often been the case,
each ofthese explanatory traditions can
deteriorate into convictions and dogmatic
assertions that either organicetiology or
psychological etiology has been proven,
without definitive evidence in either case.
Both such outcomes are to be found in this
one story. "The rise and fall ofeach
successiveexplanation forand treatment of
Tourette syndrome has been as much a study
ofthe power ofbeliefs ofaprofessional
faction as it has been avindication ofeither
rigorous scientific testing orcarefully
analyzed clinical results" (p. 219).
The syndrome underdiscussion firstcame
to public medical attention in Paris in 1825
with thepublication byJean Marc Gaspard
Itard ofthecase ofthe Marquise de
Dampierrewho would suddenly erupt in a
startling fitofobscene shouts and curses.
Then, in 1885, theParisian neurologist
Georges Gilles de la Tourette used this case as
his first andprototypical example in
describing theillness that he termed "maladie
des tics". And todayTourette's syndrome is
the common name for a set ofbehaviours
that includes recurrent ticcing and
involuntary shouting (sometimescursing) as
well as obsessive-compulsive actions.
Beginning in the nineteenth century, this
ailment was claimed by the psychogenic
explainers as surely an excellent example of
their convictions, with the psychoanalysts
taking a central role for several decades
after 1920. The somatogenic explainers were
never absent from the scene, from early
theories that such disorders were post-
infection sequelae (strengthened following
the 1919 influenza epidemic) to a family of
theories derived from modem neuroscience.
Throughout these years of argumentation,
therapeutic interventions came and went.
Psychological treatments were vigorously
espoused, though, on balance, without
much in the way offavourable results. A
wide variety of somatic treatments did not
fare much better, despite recurrent
favourable reports, until haloperidol was
shown to be an effective intervention for
controlling the tics. Soon, though, it was
being claimed that these results proved an
organic etiology for the syndrome-once
again, a priori beliefs took precedence over
evidence. But more sober-minded
investigators claimed only that "dopamine
antagonists [such as haloperidol] ... could,
in many cases, control symptoms, albeit
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